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"though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, Doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not its own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil; Rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth" -Corinthians 13
"if by supporting the rights of mankind... I shall contribute to save from the agonies of death one unfortunate victim of tyranny, or of ignorance, equally fatal, his blessing and tears of transport will be a sufficient consolation to me for the contempt of all mankind."-Marchese di Beccaria
"Raise your words, not voice. It is rain that grows flowers, not thunder." -Rumi

#Montesquieu

"It is observed by the great Montesquieu, that the laws of education ought to be relative to the principles of the government."

In despotic governments, the people should have little or no education, except what tends to inspire them with a servile fear. Information is fatal to despotism.

In monarchies, education should be partial, and adapted to the rank of each class of citizens. But “in a republican government,” says the same writer, “the whole power of education is required.” Here every class of people should know and love the laws. This knowlege should be diffused by means of schools and newspapers; and an attachment to the laws may be formed by early impressions upon the mind.

Two regulations are essential to the continuance of republican goverments: 1. Such a distribution of lands and such principles of descent and alienation, as shall give every citizen a power of acquiring what his industry merits.1 2. Such a system of education as gives every citizen an opportunity of acquiring knowlege and fitting himself for places of trust. These are fundamental articles; the sine qua non of the existence of the American republics.

Hence the absurdity of our copying the manners and adopting the institutions of Monarchies.

–  Noah Webster, On Education of the Youth in America 1788

Ci­cero de­fines Nat­ural Law as “true law.” Then he says:

“True law is right rea­son in agree­ment with na­ture; it is of uni­ver­sal ap­pli­ca­tion, un­chang­ing and ev­er­last­ing; it sum­mons to du­ty by its com­mands, and averts from wrong­do­ing by its pro­hi­bi­tions…. It is a sin to try to al­ter this law, nor is it al­low­able to re­peal any part of it, and it is im­pos­si­ble to abol­ish en­tire­ly. We can­not be freed from its obli­ga­tions by sen­ate or peo­ple, and we need not look out­side our­selves for an ex­pounder or in­ter­preter of it. And there will not be dif­fer­ent laws at Rome and Athens, or dif­fer­ent laws now and in the fu­ture, but one eter­nal and un­change­able law will be valid for all na­tions and all times, and there will be one mas­ter and ruler, that is God, over us all, for he is the au­thor of this law, its pro­mul­ga­tor, and its en­forc­ing judge. Who­ev­er is dis­obe­di­ent is flee­ing from him­self and deny­ing his hu­man na­ture, and by rea­son of this very fact he will suf­fer the worst pun­ish­ment.” 22

In these few lines the stu­dent en­coun­ters con­cepts which were re­peat­ed by the Amer­ican Founders a thou­sand times. The Law of Na­ture or Na­ture’s God is eter­nal in its ba­sic good­ness; it is uni­ver­sal in its ap­pli­ca­tion. It is a code of “right rea­son” from the Cre­ator him­self. It can­not be al­tered. It can­not be re­pealed. It can­not be aban­doned by leg­is­la­tors or the peo­ple them­selves, even though they may pre­tend to do so. In Nat­ural Law we are deal­ing with fac­tors of ab­so­lute re­al­ity. It is ba­sic in its prin­ci­ples, com­pre­hen­si­ble to the hu­man mind, and to­tal­ly cor­rect and moral­ly right in its gen­er­al op­er­ation.

To the Found­ing Fa­thers as well as to Black­stone, John Locke, Mon­tesquieu, and Ci­cero, this was a mon­umen­tal dis­cov­ery.

– The 5,000 Year Leap: Nat­ural Law Is Eter­nal and Uni­ver­sal

It is very probable that mankind would have been obliged, at length, to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they not contrived a kind of constitution, that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchial government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC.

This form of Government is a Convention, by which several smaller States agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, capable of encreasing by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body.

A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal corruption. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniencies.

If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit, in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces, independent of those which he had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.

Should a popular insurrection happen, in one of the confederate States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The State may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.

As this government is composed of small republics it enjoys the internal happiness of each, and with respect to its external situation it is possessed, by means of the association of all the advantages of large monarchies.

– Montesquieu—The Spirit of the Laws, Book 9, Chapter 1

“The ability of a confederacy to control internal violence and maintain the internal tranquility of its states, as well as increase their external security and strength, is really not a new idea at all. This has not only been practiced in different countries and at different times, but has also been approved by the most reputable political theorists. With great effort, the opponents of the new Constitution have quoted and distributed the ideas of Montesquieu in which he apparently argues that the republican form of government can only exist within a smaller territory. But they seem to have forgotten not only the opinions that the very same man expressed in another part of his work, but also the consequences of this principle that they so readily defend.
When Montesquieu recommends that republics remain territorially small, the idea he had in mind for their size was much smaller than almost every single one of our states. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can be compared to the models he used for described in his reasoning. If we accept his ideas as fact, then we are forced to conclude that we should either take refuge in the arms of monarchy or divide ourselves into an infinite number of small, jealous, clashing, disorderly states, which are themselves the sources of endless conflict and viewed with universal pity or contempt.
Some of the opponents of the Constitution seem to have been aware of this problem, and have been bold enough to suggest that the division of the larger states into smaller pieces is actually a desirable thing. Such crazy ideas and desperate suggestions might satisfy those who are unable to see beyond their own personal interests, but they could never promote the greatness or happiness of the American People.
If you look at Montesquieu’s theory with regard to just a single state, it would only require that some of the larger states of the Union be reduced in size, but would have nothing to say on whether or not the states should be joined together into single confederate government, which is the question we are now discussing.
Rather than suggest anything that would be contrary to a general union of the states, Montesquieu actually very specifically treats the idea of a confederate republic as the answer to the problem of extending the reach of popular government, while also reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of a republic.”

– The Original Argument by Glenn Beck with Joshua Charles page 156-157

“If judgments were the individual opinion of a judge, one would live in this society without knowing precisely what engagements one has contracted”

– Montesquieu, Spirit of the Law, [found referenced in Ameritopia by Mark Levin pg156]

“it may clear­ly be in­ferred that, in say­ing “There can be no lib­er­ty where the leg­isla­tive and ex­ec­utive pow­ers are unit­ed in the same per­son, or body of mag­is­trates,“ or, ”if the pow­er of judg­ing be not sep­arat­ed from the leg­isla­tive and ex­ec­utive pow­ers,” he [Montesquieu] did not mean that these de­part­ments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no CON­TROL over, the acts of each oth­er. His mean­ing, as his own words im­port, and still more con­clu­sive­ly as il­lus­trat­ed by the ex­am­ple in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the WHOLE pow­er of one de­part­ment is ex­er­cised by the same hands which pos­sess the WHOLE pow­er of an­oth­er de­part­ment, the fun­da­men­tal prin­ci­ples of a free con­sti­tu­tion are sub­vert­ed.”

Federalist 47, James Madison